Opinion: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, ‘One Nation, One Election’ Is A Constitutional Mis-step

Frequent elections compel elected representatives to remain engaged with their constituencies and responsive to public concerns.

Source : PTI

The proposal for ‘One Nation, One Election (ONOE)’ has emerged as a point of contention in political discourse. Framed as a solution to the disruptions caused by frequent elections, the idea of simultaneous polls for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies appears appealing, promising administrative efficiency and cost savings. However, beneath the surface lies a profound challenge to constitutional ethos. ONOE threatens to undermine federalism, violate the principle of fixed legislative tenures, and tilt the delicate balance of power enshrined in the Constitution. It is a solution in search of a problem — and one that risks doing more harm than good.

The Constitution establishes a federal system in which both the Union and the states derive their powers independently, through Schedule VII. This framework, upheld by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), ensures that neither the Centre nor the states can unilaterally dominate the other. Federalism, as the court declared, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and beyond the amending power of Parliament.

ONOE, however, strikes at the heart of this principle. Synchronising elections would require aligning the tenures of state assemblies with that of the Lok Sabha, necessitating arbitrary extensions or curtailments of state governments’ constitutionally guaranteed five-year terms under Article 172. By subordinating the electoral timelines of states to the Union, ONOE erodes the autonomy of state legislatures — a move antithetical to the spirit of federalism. States are not administrative appendages of the Centre; they are equal stakeholders in India’s democratic project.

ONOE Will Disrupt Balance Of Power Between Union & States

The Constitution guarantees a fixed tenure of five years for both Parliament and state assemblies, ensuring that governments have adequate time to implement their mandates while remaining accountable to voters. ONOE proposes a fundamental departure from this principle.  To synchronise elections, the tenures of some state assemblies may need to be curtailed, while others might have to be extended. For instance, the proposed Article 82A would empower the President, on the advice of the Election Commission of India (ECI), to defer elections or terminate the tenure of assemblies prematurely. Such provisions dilute the democratic mandate of state legislatures and subject their functioning to the whims of central authorities.

The Supreme Court’s decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) reaffirmed that state assemblies are integral to India’s federal framework. Curtailing their tenure for the sake of administrative uniformity not only violates the Constitution but also reduces states to subordinate entities, undermining the principle of decentralisation.

Frequent elections compel elected representatives to remain engaged with their constituencies and responsive to public concerns. They provide voters with regular opportunities to express their will, ensuring that governments remain attuned to their aspirations. The argument that frequent elections disrupt governance due to the enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is overstated. India has successfully conducted periodic elections since 1967 without any evidence of developmental stagnation. Moreover, simultaneous elections would likely shift the focus of political discourse from regional issues to national narratives, marginalising local concerns and reducing the political relevance of state-level elections. By limiting elections to once every five years, ONOE risks creating a disconnect between governments and the people they serve. Without the constant pressure of electoral accountability, elected officials could become complacent, prioritising party interests over public welfare.

The Constitution is not merely a legal document; it is the foundation of India’s democratic ethos. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Kesavananda Bharati established the doctrine of basic structure, declaring that elements like federalism, democracy, and separation of powers are inviolable. Parliament, while empowered to amend the Constitution, cannot alter these fundamental principles.

The ONOE proposal risks violating this doctrine. Curtailing or extending the tenures of state assemblies disrupts the balance of power between the Union and states, a balance that is central to the Constitution’s federal character. Even if ONOE secures parliamentary approval, it is almost certain to face judicial scrutiny. Based on past precedents, it is unlikely to survive the test of constitutional validity. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment that sought to insulate certain electoral practices from judicial review, holding that it violated the basic structure of democracy. The ONOE proposal, by centralising power and undermining federalism, raises similar concerns.

The ONOE proposal also risks centralising disproportionate authority in the hands of the President and the ECI. The proposed Article 82A grants these institutions significant discretion to defer state elections or synchronise them with the Lok Sabha. This centralisation not only undermines the federal model but also opens the door to potential misuse. For instance, the power to delay or reschedule elections could be wielded to favour the ruling party at the Centre, particularly in Opposition-ruled states. Such a scenario would not only erode public trust in the electoral process but also damage the credibility of independent institutions like the ECI.

One of the ONOE benefits cited often is the financial savings of holding simultaneous elections. However, this argument is not as compelling as it seems. Election-related expenses constitute a small fraction of India’s overall budget, and the proposed savings are unlikely to justify the constitutional, democratic, and logistical costs of implementing ONOE. Moreover, the assumption that synchronised elections would streamline governance is speculative at best. In a democracy as vibrant and diverse as India’s, the administrative challenges of conducting nationwide simultaneous elections could outweigh any potential benefits.

Dangerous Oversimplification

The idea of ‘One Nation, One Election’ is an attractive yet dangerous oversimplification. It prioritises administrative convenience over constitutional principles, efficiency over federalism, and centralisation over diversity. By undermining the autonomy of states, disrupting fixed legislative tenures, and weakening democratic accountability, ONOE poses a serious threat to the foundational values of India’s democracy.

India’s strength lies in its diversity and decentralisation. Frequent elections, while administratively demanding, reflect this vibrancy. They compel governments to remain accountable, ensure that regional issues are addressed, and reinforce the pluralistic character of Indian democracy. As the debate over ONOE continues, it is vital to remember that the Constitution is a living document, designed to adapt to the needs of a dynamic society. However, any attempt to alter its basic structure must be resisted. For, in safeguarding the Constitution, we safeguard not just the rule of law but the very soul of Indian democracy.

The writer is a legal researcher. 

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