Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a three-nation tour to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand on 6 July in an effort to not just secure robust and stable supply chain linkages through greater trade and economic partnership, but to also create its own Indo-Pacific alliance of sorts even as the United States appears to be becoming increasingly uncertain, unstable and unreliable. Yet another factor that has induced India to give more teeth to its own maritime security vision of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR and link it with the Indo-Pacific strategic initiatives of other countries was Beijing’s sudden decision to conduct a long-range missile test in the South Pacific that has rattled countries in the region.
The three-nation tour by Modi took place in less than a week since the Prime Minister of Japan Sanae Takaichi came to India on a maiden visit even as New Delhi and Tokyo decided to go for an “updated” FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific). Under this arrangement, both sides have decided to link India’s strategic vision for the maritime domain as laid out in its MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) outlook – an enhance form of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region).
On 6 July, just as Australia and Fiji signed a defence pact keeping an eye on China, Beijing conducted a long-range missile test in the South Pacific on the same day that has rattled nations in the region. China tested a JL2 or JL3 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the South China Sea (SCS) that landed in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The missile covered a range of around 7,300 kms flying over Philippines. Beijing has said the test was “not directed at any specific country or target” and that the launch operations were “conducted safely, in a standardised manner and professionally.” A statement issued by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said that the missile test was a “routine part of China’s annual military training program, and relevant countries had been notified in advance.”
Australia did admit that China had given prior notice that it will conduct such a test but it was not made clear what kind of a missile would be tested. Australia’s Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles told the media after the test was conducted: “his is a long-range missile test, and we are very concerned about any actions which undermine the stability, the peace, and security of the Pacific.” Japan also expressed serious concerns and said it has urged China not to fire the test missile.
India’s Renewed Focus On Indo-Pacific
India had unveiled its own vision of maritime domain awareness under the SAGAR initiative in 2015, which primarily took a regional and security-centric outlook. This policy was then enhanced to MAHASAGAR reflecting New Delhi’s proactive response to shifting dynamics in the Indian Ocean, focusing heavily on maritime security, regular naval exercises, and stabilizing ties with traditional partners in the neighbourhood.
In all the joint statements that India signed in the last seven days with Japan, Indonesia and Australia, the common thread has been India’s renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific, which is not restricted to the definition laid out by the United States, but one that is based on the needs and urgencies of the countries present in this geography that continue to face challenges from Beijing in the maritime domain. With Japan, Indonesia and Australia, New Delhi sought to link Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) with that of MAHASAGAR.
India this time also sought to inject a fresh lease of life to the ‘Shared Vision of India-Indonesia on Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ that Delhi and Jakarta signed in 2018 but never put it to use in practical terms as both the capitals did not want to upset Beijing. But this time both Modi and the Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto decided to activate the cooperation even as they vowed “strong commitment to further enhance and broaden the defence and maritime partnership.” Jakarta even agreed to buy more missiles from New Delhi even as both sides sought to give a more strategic edge to the bilateral ties which was elevated to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ in 2018.
In a massive departure from India’s usual stance, New Delhi chose to share the same concerns as Australia which raised the issue of China’s missile test during Modi’s visit to that country.
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said, “Regarding the question about the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launch, yes, this was raised by the Australian premier, and there was a certain amount of concern expressed about this development. The Prime Minister mentioned that we see the Indo-Pacific as an area where we would like to see peace, security, and stability. Australia and India have shared interests and shared objectives in this regard and will continue to not only exchange perspectives on this but also intensify cooperation in various areas to ensure that peace, security, and stability in the Indo-Pacific area continue to be met.”
New Delhi has taken a firm stance, demonstrating its intention to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. This strategic shift reflects a conscious decision to not only lean on the support of the United States but to concentrate more on strengthening alliances with countries in the Pacific. By doing so, India aims to cultivate a network of partnerships that enhances its influence and security in a geopolitically sensitive area.