The India-China relationship has always been defined by contradictions: shared civilizational roots paired with hardened modern rivalries, economic complementarities offset by deep strategic distrust. Since the Kazan Summit of October 2024, however, a cautious thaw has been underway. This year alone has witnessed a spurt of bilateral exchanges across government, think tanks, media, and academia. Visa relaxations, the resumption of pilgrimages, people-to-people ties, and imminent direct flights have added substance to the process. Negotiations on trade and economic cooperation continue, while the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Delhi underscored the urgency of sustaining the reset. Yet, if optimism fuels the current momentum, caution defines its limits. Beijing’s support for Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, curbs on rare earth magnets and specialist personnel, and fresh tariffs have made it clear that while rapprochement may be in motion, reconciliation is still far away.
The shadows of Galwan still loom large. The 2020 clash in Ladakh and the subsequent standoff derailed years of careful engagement and left both governments grappling with an unprecedented erosion of trust. The last five years were marked by military stalemate and diplomatic frost, with only partial disengagements along the Line of Actual Control. Troops remain deployed in high numbers—around 60,000 on each side—while true de-escalation or border settlement remains elusive. This fragile frontier peace underscores the enduring schism between India and China. While Beijing champions multipolarity at the global level, it has consistently resisted a multipolar Asia—an outcome India sees as essential. China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean has expanded steadily, while its strategic courtship of South Asian states continues to keep India hemmed in. Simultaneously, Beijing continues arming Islamabad and expanding influence through economic corridors that encroach on Indian sovereignty, while New Delhi counters with its own outreach, including arms sales to Southeast Asia. Disagreements over trade restrictions, contrasting stances on Taiwan and the South China Sea, and unresolved concerns over Tibet further complicate ties. The two powers are not merely neighbours; they are competitors for resources, markets, and influence across the Global South.
Given such fault lines, why attempt a reset at all? The answer lies in geography, economics, and the logic of multipolarity. India and China are bound by their shared frontier and their shared status as demographic and economic giants. Nearly three billion people live in these two countries, yet mutual ignorance—both at the societal and policy levels—remains striking. For decades, this lack of understanding has hobbled productive engagement. In today’s world, defined by economic interdependence and shifting global power balances, such neglect is a luxury neither can afford. China offers lessons in urbanisation, green energy, digital ecosystems, and frontier technologies. Its manufacturing muscle remains unmatched. India, meanwhile, provides what China increasingly requires: a vast and growing market. If the two can forge even modest cooperation, the ripple effects could be transformative for Asia.
Grand visions like the Belt and Road Initiative or the BCIM corridor remain weighed down by mistrust, but sectoral partnerships offer more immediate prospects. Tourism, agricultural machinery, consumer goods, and services can deliver fast, low-risk gains. Supply-chain reconfigurations also strengthen the logic of India-China complementarities: Indian demand and scale married to Chinese expertise and capital. The result may lack the spectacle of sweeping strategic agreements, but steady economic collaboration can gradually build the foundations of stability.
India’s foreign policy doctrine has always prioritised strategic autonomy. In a multipolar world, this instinct only grows stronger. Permanent allies or permanent adversaries are illusions; what endures is national interest. India, now the world’s most populous nation, the fourth-strongest military power, and a soon-to-be third-largest economy, has the confidence to act pragmatically. This means New Delhi will continue to hedge, engaging Beijing where convergence is possible, even while deepening deterrence and pursuing closer ties with the United States, Japan, and Europe. Beijing, too, recognises that prolonged hostility with India undermines its broader regional calculus, particularly when Washington courts New Delhi as a counterweight. Thus, the rapprochement is not born of trust but of necessity. Both powers are recalibrating to navigate a fluid global order marked by economic slowdown, protectionist tariffs, and shifting coalitions. The much-discussed “Trump factor” in U.S. politics may influence calculations, but the current reset has deeper structural drivers.
The India-China thaw remains fragile, suspended between suspicion and necessity. On the one hand, the breadth of agreements — from visas to trade talks — suggests momentum. On the other hand, the persistence of border deployments, Beijing’s overtures to Pakistan, and divergent worldviews reveal how brittle the foundation remains. For New Delhi, the guiding principle must remain pragmatic engagement without illusions. Every state is a partner until proven otherwise, and every rapprochement must be balanced by preparedness. Caution is not a weakness but a strategic imperative. In this light, the current reset with China should be seen not as a new beginning but as a careful recalibration — an attempt to manage rivalry without closing the door on cooperation.
(The writer is a technocrat, political analyst, and author)
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