After SIR, A New Electoral Threat Emerges For Mamata: The Erosion Of Women Voters

OPINION | India's Lipulekh Trade Challenge With Nepal's Balen Shah Government

Nayanima Basu — Thu, 2 Apr 2026 19:00:22 +0530

After a prolonged period marked by significant political upheaval, Nepal has embarked on a transformative journey, culminating in what many are calling a Gen-Z revolution in September 2025. This particular episode led to the establishment of a new government, reflecting the desires and aspirations of a younger generation eager for change. Amidst this backdrop, the Nepali populace has overwhelmingly cast their votes in favor of a newly formed political party, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), under the leadership of Balendra Shah, or Balen. At 35 years old, he is the youngest leader in Nepal's history and the first Prime Minister from the Madhesi community. Shah was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal just last month, leaving the international community, particularly in neighboring India, both surprised and intrigued by these developments.

The relationship between India and Nepal has historically been characterized by close political, economic, and cultural ties, bolstered by open borders that facilitate movement and connection between the two countries. This unique aspect of their relationship stands in contrast to India's interactions with other neighbouring nations, where border regulations are more stringent. However, since 2014, the bilateral relations between New Delhi and Kathmandu have experienced numerous challenges. Various incidents and policy decisions have led to a deterioration of these once-strong ties, marking a period of unprecedented strain in what was traditionally considered a robust partnership.

After the BJP came to power in May 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose Nepal to be his first official foreign destination. The visit turned out to be a historical one wherein India committed to resolving the pending border issue with Nepal as well as revisiting the 1950 Friendship Treaty with Nepal, a long pending demand of Kathmandu. India even committed to establish a foreign secretary-level talks to resolve the border issue.

Modi’s maiden visit to Nepal as the Prime Minister took place on August 3-4, 2014 even as both sides laid down an elaborate path of cooperation. It was his first visit to the country after taking office and the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 17 years. The visit was a key part of the new government's ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’, following his invitation to SAARC leaders for his swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. The visit from all aspects turned out to be a landmark trip.

Modi became the first foreign leader to address Nepal’s Constituent Assembly and Legislature Parliament. He announced a $1 billion soft line of credit for infrastructure and energy projects. India and Nepal also signed agreements to expedite the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project and established a 45-day deadline for a Power Trade Agreement.

While the 2014 visit initially rekindled hope for a breakthrough, the process of revisiting the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship remained stalled. Although both sides agreed to "review, adjust, and update" the treaty during Modi’s visit, the matter has since been caught in a cycle of consensus-building and diplomatic delays.

The downfall in bilateral ties got accelerated with the coming in of the KP Sharma Oli government in Nepal in October 2015, who took an aggressive stance against India. He was the first Prime Minister elected under Nepal's newly adopted 2015 constitution, securing 338 votes in a parliamentary election against his rival, Sushil Koirala. This first tenure lasted until August 4, 2016, when he resigned after losing the support of his coalition partners.

But matters between both countries hit nadir with the onset of the 2015-2016 Nepal border blockade, which turned out to be a major humanitarian and diplomatic crisis that lasted for nearly five months, from September 2015 to February 2016. It was triggered by the promulgation of Nepal's new constitution, which Madhesi and Tharu ethnic groups in the southern Terai region claimed marginalized them. Madhesi groups, who share close cultural and linguistic ties with India, argued that the new 2015 Constitution reduced their political representation and inclusive federalism.

The crisis strained India-Nepal relations and pushed Nepal to sign a landmark fuel and transit agreement with China to reduce its total dependency on India.

Meanwhile, in 2020, again under Oli’s second term as the PM, Nepal revised its national map to include approximately 335 square kilometres of territory-Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura-which is also claimed and currently administered by India. The decision was triggered by a series of events that Nepal viewed as an encroachment on its sovereignty. In November 2019, India released a new map following the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir. Nepal protested that this map incorrectly depicted the disputed Kalapani region as Indian territory.

The immediate trigger, however, was India's inauguration of an 80-km road connecting Dharchula (Uttarakhand) to the Lipulekh Pass, a strategic route for the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage. Nepal claimed this road passed through its territory.

While Nepal continues to use the new map, which has been rejected by New Delhi, the matter continues to create tensions in the bilateral ties even as it has the potential to once again trigger a major diplomatic row under the newly formed Balen Shah dispensation.

This is because last month, India said it is planning to resume border trade with China, after a hiatus of six years, through the Lipulekh Pass. The trade through this route used to take place annually between June and September. Trade through this route got stalled due to Covid, followed by tensions between India and China over the military standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.

The map change by Nepal led to a significant "cartographic war" and strained long-standing diplomatic relations. Nepal protested this as a violation of its sovereignty, citing the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, which identifies the Kali River as the western boundary of Nepal.

To formalize the map, the Oli government passed the Second Amendment to the Constitution in June 2020. This amendment updated the national emblem to include the revised map and received unanimous support from all political parties in Nepal's Parliament.

With India planning to resume trade again through the Lipulekh Pass, the same old challenges can come back to strain the ties again even as the new Balen Shah dispensation has said his government is “eager to work closely” with New Delhi.

In August 2025, the RSP had strongly objected to India and China resuming trade through the Lipulekh Pass, calling it a violation of Nepal's territorial sovereignty. The party, which is now ruling in Nepal, demanded that the government address the dispute regarding Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura firmly with both neighbours-India and China.

The matter was vehemently taken up by RSP’s Shishir Khanal who was then the party’s head of international department. In a statement to the then Oli government he had said that Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura are "inseparable parts" of Nepal and that “No activity or agreement by any country on Nepali land is valid without Nepal’s consent.”

Khanal’s 2025 stance is significant as he now holds the position of Foreign Minister of Nepal, which places him in the direct role of managing these very diplomatic challenges. Therefore, it has become imperative for India now to consider this matter seriously and initiate a dialogue with Kathmandu thereby resolving the matter amicably before resumption of the trade with China.

[Disclaimer: The opinions, beliefs, and views expressed by the various authors and forum participants on this website are personal and do not reflect the opinions, beliefs, and views of ABP News Network Pvt Ltd.]

After SIR, A New Electoral Threat Emerges For Mamata: The Erosion Of Women Voters

Sayantan Ghosh — Sun, 29 Mar 2026 13:57:13 +0530

As the West Bengal Assembly elections approach, all attention remains fixed on Mamata Banerjee and the Trinamool Congress. While much of the debate around the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls has centred on its impact on Muslim voters, a deeper and more widespread challenge is quietly emerging for the ruling party. Women, who have long served as one of the Trinamool Congress’s strongest and most consistent pillars of support, now show signs of erosion in ways that concentrated community mobilisation cannot easily offset.

Unlike Muslim voters, who tend to cluster in specific pockets where shared anxieties can drive high turnout and consolidation despite deletions, women voters are dispersed across every constituency in the state. Their preferences have repeatedly proven decisive, turning competitive seats into comfortable victories for the Trinamool Congress through multiple election cycles. This broad distribution makes their support both uniquely powerful and especially vulnerable to even modest shifts in numbers or enthusiasm.

The SIR process has reversed a long-standing trend of improving gender balance in Bengal’s electoral rolls. For the first time in over a decade, the ratio of women to men among registered voters has declined noticeably. This contraction raises serious concerns for a party that has relied heavily on women’s loyalty to secure its hold on power.

In 2021, the Trinamool Congress leaned into women-centric campaigns and newly introduced welfare schemes to build a formidable gender advantage. Slogans that framed Mamata Banerjee as the protector of Bengal’s daughters struck a chord, while schemes promising direct financial assistance generated fresh hope among women from poorer households.

Today, those galvanising narratives feel distant. The welfare programmes that once sparked enthusiasm have settled into routine support with only modest increments. Fresh controversies surrounding women’s safety have tested loyalty across different sections of female voters. When women are spread throughout the state rather than confined to particular areas, any decline in their registration or enthusiasm tends to ripple through hundreds of booths, quietly undermining margins that once appeared secure.

The coming election may well determine whether the Trinamool Congress can rebuild momentum among this critical but dispersed base or whether the silent erosion of women’s support will prove more damaging than deletions in concentrated minority pockets. In the final analysis, Mamata Banerjee’s biggest worry may not rest solely in the arithmetic of Muslim voter lists, but in the broader weakening of the gender edge that has underpinned her party’s repeated successes.

How Women Delivered for Mamata Banerjee

Women voters played a pivotal role in the TMC's 2021 triumph. Their higher support compensated for any turnout gaps and amplified margins in competitive seats. The 13-point gender lead over the BJP among women translated into decisive seat gains across rural and urban areas. Schemes promising financial assistance to women heads of households, initially Rs 500 for general category and Rs 1,000 for SC/ST/OBC, resonated strongly, particularly among the poor and lower classes. The TMC fielded 50 women candidates, signalling inclusivity.

Campaigns such as “Bangla Nijer Mey Ke Chay” (Bengal Wants Its Own Daughter) framed Mamata Banerjee as a protector of women's interests against perceived threats from the BJP. This narrative, combined with tangible benefits from existing programmes, helped the party retain and expand its edge even as the BJP made inroads among men and certain Hindu social groups.

Post-2021 trends showed women's turnout often matching or exceeding men's in several phases, underscoring their growing electoral agency. Unlike bloc voting in concentrated minority areas, women's preferences operate constituency by constituency, making their erosion harder to contain through localised mobilisation.

The Impact of SIR on Women Voters

The SIR exercise has triggered a measurable contraction in women's presence on the rolls. According to reports, the drop from 969 to 964 women per 1,000 men reverses a decade-long improvement in gender balance among electors. With total voters falling by nearly 16% in net terms (accounting for deletions and pending cases), even a modest disproportionate deletion of women -- driven by documentation hurdles around marriage, relocation, or family verification -- can significantly reduce their share. In a state where women comprise nearly half the electorate, a 5-point ratio decline, if sustained or compounded by adjudication outcomes, could translate into several lakh fewer women voters participating.

Analysts note that deletions hit districts with mixed demographics, but the gender skew suggests broader effects beyond Muslim-heavy pockets. Issues like name mismatches after marriage or incomplete paperwork disproportionately burden women, who may have lower access to consistent documentation. While the BJP attributes any decline to social factors such as alleged female foeticide under TMC rule, the timing and scale point to procedural outcomes of the intensive revision. Over 60 lakh cases under adjudication for weeks created uncertainty, potentially discouraging registration drives among women who might face additional barriers in producing proofs.

Quantifying the exact percentage drop in effective women's votes remains challenging without final supplementary lists, but the ratio shift alone signals a reversal of the trend that favoured the TMC.

If women previously formed 48-49% of the electorate with higher loyalty, even a 1-2% absolute reduction in their numbers -- or suppressed turnout due to deletion angst -- could shave critical margins in dozens of marginal seats where the 2021 victory hinged on 5-10% swings.

Calculating The Challenge For TMC

To offset potential losses from a shrunken and less enthusiastic women base, the TMC may need to achieve extraordinarily high consolidation among remaining women voters, potentially exceeding 55-60% in key segments, to maintain its edge. In 2021, the 50% support among women delivered a 13-point lead over the BJP. Assuming a 5-8% effective drop in women electors due to the ratio decline and adjudication (a conservative estimate based on overall shrinkage and gender skew), the party would require compensating gains elsewhere or deeper penetration among women who do remain on the rolls.

Simple arithmetic illustrates the pressure.

If women voters drop from roughly 49% to 47-48% of the total electorate, and their support slips even marginally due to fatigue, the TMC's overall vote share could dip below the 2021 level in competitive constituencies. To secure similar seat outcomes, the party might need women support to climb towards 55%+ among the reduced pool, especially in non-Muslim majority areas where votes are more fragmented. This threshold becomes harder without fresh mobilisation tools. Muslim voters, concentrated in about 125 influential seats, can still consolidate behind the TMC out of shared concerns over the SIR and BJP’s Hindutva and its policies, mitigating deletions through community turnout. Women, dispersed everywhere, offer no such easy recovery mechanism.

Fresh Challenges And Absence Of Past Advantages

Compounding the SIR effect are governance issues that risk alienating women. The RG Kar Medical College incident and associated protests highlighted concerns around women's safety and institutional accountability, generating widespread discontent among urban and educated women.

Unlike the 2021 campaign's focused appeal to women as a unified constituency, recent TMC messaging lacks equivalent galvanising slogans or women-centric drives. The Lakshmir Bhandar scheme, a game-changer in 2021 when newly launched, now faces diminished returns. The government has hiked the monthly assistance by only Rs 500 (to Rs 1,500 for general category and Rs 1,700 for SC/ST women), a modest increment that may not reignite the same hope or gratitude after five years of implementation. Inflation, repeated demands for larger support, and competition from opposition promises (including BJP signals of higher amounts) erode its novelty.

In past elections, fresh welfare announcements and a narrative of Mamata Banerjee as the "daughter" defending Bengal's women created emotional and material bonds. This time, with the scheme mature and incremental rather than transformative, and amid controversies over safety and governance, consolidating 50%+ women support demands heavier lifting. Women are not monolithic; their votes split along class, caste, and regional lines, with poorer women historically more loyal but increasingly expectant of sustained benefits. Middle and upper-class women show more volatility.

For the TMC, the women voter decline poses a broader strategic headache than Muslim list deletions alone. Pockets of Muslim concentration allow targeted recovery through fear of the BJP and community networks. Women, integral to every booth, require universal outreach that the current mix of modest scheme tweaks and reactive narratives may struggle to deliver.

(Sayantan Ghosh is the author of two books, Battleground Bengal and The Aam Aadmi Party, and teaches at St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata.)