OPINION | India’s Forex Anxiety And The Illusion Of Self-Reliance

OPINION | How TMC Lost Bengal: Abhishek Banerjee’s ‘Corporate Model’, I-PAC And Crisis Of Cadre Politics

Sayantan Ghosh — Wed, 3 Jun 2026 12:49:54 +0530

The Trinamool Congress (TMC), founded by Mamata Banerjee as a vehicle for grassroots resistance against the Left’s long dominance in West Bengal, now finds itself in a sharp decline. In the 2026 West Bengal Assembly elections, the party crashed from 215 seats in 2021 to just 80, while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stormed to power with around 208 seats. This reversal marks not merely an electoral defeat but a deeper organisational rupture. Senior leaders and cadres increasingly point to a “corporate culture” imposed under Abhishek Banerjee, Mamata’s nephew and the party’s National General Secretary, which replaced the TMC’s traditional bottom-up mobilisation with top-down control, data-driven strategies, and area domination tactics.

Mamata Banerjee built the TMC through relentless on-ground presence, personal accessibility, and welfare outreach that connected directly with voters, especially in rural Bengal. Her style emphasised organic local leadership and cadre autonomy. In contrast, Abhishek Banerjee’s approach, amplified after the 2021 victory, sought to professionalise the party via centralised command structures and external consultants. This shift, while delivering short-term gains in 2021 and respectable performance in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, ultimately alienated traditional workers, bred resentment among veterans, and proved vulnerable when anti-incumbency surged. The model’s collapse became evident in pockets like Diamond Harbour, where heavy reliance on strongmen and surveillance-style control backfired under neutral polling conditions. As internal rifts widen —with low attendance at Mamata’s recent meetings and leaders distancing themselves — the party’s crisis underscores a fundamental truth: corporate-style centralisation cannot sustainably substitute for genuine grassroots politics in a state as politically vibrant and diverse as West Bengal.

Jahangir Khan’s Falta Debacle and the Collapse of the Diamond Harbour Model

The Diamond Harbour Model, closely associated with Abhishek Banerjee’s parliamentary constituency, was projected as a blueprint for efficient welfare delivery and local dominance. It combined doorstep governance — pension camps, health infrastructure, and fast-tracked services — with aggressive area control. Proponents highlighted infrastructure projects like long flyovers and outreach initiatives such as “Ek Daak E Abhishek.” Yet, beneath the development narrative lay a strategy of opposition-free consolidation through strongmen and intimidation.

Falta assembly constituency, falling under Diamond Harbour Lok Sabha, exemplified this model’s limits. Jahangir Khan, a close aide of Abhishek, often seen as emblematic of its enforcement arm, was the TMC candidate. Just 48 hours before the repoll in May 2026, Khan withdrew, citing “peace and development.”

Despite remaining on the ballot, he secured only about 7,783 votes, finishing a distant fourth. The BJP’s Debangshu Panda won by a massive margin exceeding 1.09 lakh votes. This outcome, under heightened Election Commission scrutiny and central forces ensuring fair polling, exposed how the model depended on unchecked local pressure rather than organic support.

When voters could exercise choice without fear, many who had earlier backed TMC turned against it. Reports of surveillance, silencing of dissent, and reliance on muscle power unravelled. The model, once touted for replicating statewide success, failed spectacularly as anti-incumbency and cadre fatigue overpowered enforced loyalty. Unlike Mamata’s organic connect, which weathered multiple challenges through personal credibility, Abhishek’s experiment proved brittle when its coercive underpinnings were neutralised.

The Shift to Centralised Control

Abhishek Banerjee’s ascent as National General Secretary accelerated a corporate-style overhaul that sidelined veteran grassroots organisers. Unlike leaders such as Mukul Roy or Suvendu Adhikari, who rose through local networks and mass mobilisation, Abhishek emphasised hierarchical decision-making from offices in Camac Street and district headquarters.

Post-2019, when TMC faced defections, Abhishek brought in Indian Political Action Committee (I-PAC), initially led by Prashant Kishor, to engineer the 2021 turnaround. After Kishor’s exit, control shifted to other I-PAC founders, embedding data analytics, ticket strategy, and messaging under Abhishek’s oversight.

This centralisation stripped local leaders of autonomy. Organisational decisions, once shaped by district committees and long-time workers, now bear Abhishek’s stamp, monitored through parallel structures. Grassroots politicians felt marginalised as power concentrated at the top. Mamata Banerjee, known for her accessibility, became insulated by layers of filters. Traditional cadres, who thrived on direct engagement, found themselves reporting to external consultants rather than influencing policy or candidate selection.

The result was a party increasingly detached from its base. While this approach delivered a 2021 victory by professionalising campaigns, it eroded the organic loyalty that defined TMC under Mamata. Veterans who built the party through street fights and village-level organising grew resentful, viewing the new culture as alien and unaccountable. Centralisation, intended to prevent defections, instead accelerated internal alienation by prioritising loyalty to the apex over local realities.

I-PAC’s Enduring Influence and Cadre Resentment

I-PAC remained deeply embedded post-2021, influencing tickets, media narratives, messaging, and even day-to-day access. Ticket distribution, previously a collective exercise involving Mamata, state president Subrata Bakshi, and senior leaders, tilted heavily towards Abhishek and I-PAC inputs.

Insiders allege this process created rifts, overlooked local aspirations, and fostered miscommunication. A barrier emerged between ground-level workers and top leadership, hindering feedback loops that once kept Mamata attuned to the grassroots pulse.

Traditional TMC cadres, accustomed to fluid, leader-driven politics, chafed under what they saw as an unaccountable parallel apparatus. I-PAC’s role in candidate vetting and strategy bred accusations of favouritism and corruption in selections. While data-driven methods helped in targeted outreach, they could not replace the emotional and relational bonds Mamata cultivated. Over-dependence on consultants distanced the party from its core strength: a vast network of local organisers who mobilised voters through personal ties and community presence.

This influence persisted despite growing criticism, turning I-PAC into a lightning rod for post-poll blame. Leaders argued that the consultancy’s dominance destroyed organisational depth, replacing committed workers with temporary, top-down executors. The resentment culminated in open distancing, as many felt the party had become a corporate entity rather than a people’s movement.

The 2026 Debacle: When Top-Down Tactics Met Anti-Incumbency

By 2026, the cumulative effects of centralisation and area control proved fatal. Strongman tactics and surveillance alienated cadres, while corruption allegations against local enforcers did not reach the top. Anti-incumbency, built over years of governance challenges, overwhelmed the model. TMC’s vote share dropped, and its seats plummeted to 80 against the BJP’s surge.

The Falta rout served as a microcosm: under free and fair conditions, enforced dominance evaporated. Post-poll, Abhishek faced a mob attack in Sonarpur with minimal local TMC support around him, highlighting isolation. A subsequent meeting called by Mamata saw drastically low attendance from MLAs, signalling widespread disillusionment.

Mamata’s grassroots TMC succeeded by empowering local voices and maintaining direct connectivity. Abhishek’s corporate experiment, while innovative in execution, failed to nurture that base. It created a top-heavy structure ill-equipped for organic political battles. As the party navigates opposition, rebuilding requires reclaiming the accessibility and cadre empowerment that defined its rise—lessons from a centralisation that promised efficiency but delivered detachment. The Diamond Harbour Model’s fall reaffirms that in Indian democracy, especially Bengal’s, no amount of corporate strategy can fully eclipse the power of rooted, people-centric politics.

Sayantan Ghosh teaches journalism at St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata. He is on X as @sayantan_gh.

[Disclaimer: The opinions, beliefs, and views expressed by the various authors and forum participants on this website are personal and do not reflect the opinions, beliefs, and views of ABP News Network Pvt Ltd.]

OPINION | Why China Can’t Invade Taiwan

Ranjit Kumar — Sun, 24 May 2026 08:37:06 +0530

The threat of conflict hangs heavily over the Taiwan Strait as China continues to aggressive military deployment and muscle flexing in the region. Meanwhile, Taiwan, which considers itself a sovereign nation, is bolstering its defences and conducting military drills to prepare for any potential invasion by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). This state of tension, characterized by a precarious balance of "no war, no peace," has persisted since the late 1990s, largely due to the Chinese government's concern that an invasion could jeopardize its economic interests and lead to serious geo-political and geo-economic fallout.

Taiwanese citizens are resolute in their commitment to safeguarding their democratic way of life, willing to make significant sacrifices to maintain their freedom. The determination of the Taiwanese people to protect their sovereignty poses a considerable challenge for China, as any military action could have profound repercussions both domestically and internationally. Should the PLA attempt to land troops on the island, it is likely to encounter fierce resistance, potentially leading to intense urban combat and extensive aerial bombardment that could devastate Taiwan's modern economy, which is also intertwined with China's.

Despite the ongoing political strife and fundamental disagreements regarding Taiwan's status, both sides have cultivated a complex network of economic interdependencies. Taiwan has become one of China's largest investors, with Taiwanese businesses investing over USD 203 billion from 1991 to 2022, while bilateral trade has reached over USD 225 billion. This intricate relationship highlights the strategic dependencies and significant risks that both nations face, as over one million Taiwanese citizens live and work in China, contributing to the employment of millions of Chinese and reinforcing the economic ties between the two.

Currently, Chinese companies in the fields of artificial intelligence and electronics heavily rely on advanced semiconductor chips manufactured in Taiwan. The collaboration with Taiwanese technology has played a crucial role in China's economic transformation. Aware of this dependency, China is taking a pragmatic stance. While Taiwan has refrained from declaring full independence, the resilient spirit of its people continues to deter any significant military efforts by China to assert control over the island, which is home to over 23 million people.

The issue of Taiwan was a prominent topic during the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping from May 13 to 15 in Beijing. Xi cautioned Trump against further arming Taiwan with advanced weaponry, emphasizing the need to respect established redlines. In recent years, China has intensified its rhetoric regarding the reunification of Taiwan, expressing strong discontent over the United States' decision to provide Taiwan with another lot of arms valued at $14 billion. This includes Patriot interceptor missiles and advanced NASAMS surface to air missile systems . Earlier last December, Taiwan had received another consignment of arms worth USD 11 billion. In response, China has blocked the visit of Elbridge Colby, a senior Pentagon policy official, to Beijing.

Taiwan is making significant efforts to assert its sovereignty, a territory that is claimed by China, which identifies itself as the People's Republic of China, with Taiwan regarded as one of its provinces. The historical context dates back to the establishment of the Republic of China by President Jiang Kai-shek, following the communist revolution that ousted him in 1949. As the communists took control of Beijing, the Republic of China flag was raised in Taipei, symbolizing the ongoing struggle for identity and governance between the two entities.

The Republic of China, commonly known as Taiwan, has established itself as a formidable economic and industrial powerhouse, significantly contributing to both China's economic growth and the global economy. Among its key players, the Taiwanese company Foxconn stands out as a major investor in China, employing hundreds of thousands of workers and supplying essential high-tech components to various Chinese enterprises. The role of Taiwanese companies is vital in the supply chains of industrialized nations, and any disruption in these networks would be detrimental to China's modern industries.

The Taiwan Strait has become a critical flashpoint in global geopolitics, marked by China's assertive stance and Taiwan's resolute defence of its sovereignty. Despite the heightened tensions, particularly during Donald Trump's visit to Beijing in mid-May, China has refrained from taking military action against Taiwan. Instead, its strategy aligns with the teachings of ancient strategist Sun Tzu, emphasizing the importance of winning a war without engaging in direct conflict. This approach has led to a state of strategic ambiguity, where China often escalates tensions in response to high-level interactions between U.S. and Taiwanese leaders or discussions regarding Taiwan's independence.

Recently, tensions have intensified due to the election of Taiwan's new President, Lai Ching-te, whose reaffirmation of Taiwan's distinct identity has alarmed Beijing. In response, China has increased military pressure through drills and incursions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone. Taiwan, in turn, has conducted its own Han Kuang military exercises to assess its combat readiness and safeguard critical infrastructure, such as airports and seaports, while also preparing for potential cyber attacks and blockades. Additionally, Taiwan is focusing on asymmetric strategies to effectively counterbalance much stronger China's military might.

In anticipation of President Trump's visit, China intensified its military maneuvers around Taiwan, conducting extensive exercises that simulated invasion scenarios. This military posturing is often accompanied by aggressive rhetoric directed at Taiwanese leaders, heightening concerns about potential military escalation in the Taiwan Strait. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping's statement that he has instructed the military to prepare for a possible invasion by 2027 provided some reassurance to strategic analysts, that China would not invade Taiwan in near future.

The ongoing China-Taiwan military tensions significantly affects the Taiwan Strait, a crucial area for global shipping routes and home to leading semiconductor manufacturers essential to the economies of China, the United States, and the industrialized world. Disruptions in this region could have severe repercussions for global supply chains. Additionally, the United States is involved in this dispute, as it is committed to providing defensive support under the Taiwan Relations Act. Any military action against Taiwan would likely provoke a U.S. military response, risking a broader confrontation in the region, which China is keen to avoid.

A full-scale war would not only result in substantial casualties for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) but also have significant domestic repercussions for China. Furthermore, a conflict involving Taiwan and the U.S. would severely impact China's already strained economy. Given these considerations, it is likely that China will refrain from invading Taiwan, opting instead to maintain strategic ambiguity through psychological warfare, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation.

( The writer is a senior journalist and strategic affairs analyst)

OPINION | Great Nicobar: India’s Strategic Frontier In The Indian Ocean

Dr Prosenjit Nath — Sat, 23 May 2026 13:04:42 +0530

India’s decision to transform Great Nicobar Island into a major transhipment hub, military-logistics centre, and economic gateway is not merely another infrastructure project. It is a declaration of intent. In an era where maritime power increasingly determines geopolitical influence, the Great Nicobar project represents one of the most ambitious strategic moves undertaken by India since independence.

As former Brigadier Sanjay Iyer rightly observed, the project gives India “a persistent presence in the eastern Indian Ocean rather than the occasional visit.” That statement captures the essence of the initiative. For decades, India has geographically occupied a commanding position in the Indian Ocean but has failed to fully leverage it strategically. Great Nicobar could finally change that equation.

Located near the Malacca Strait, one of the busiest and most critical maritime chokepoints in the world, the island sits at the crossroads of global trade routes connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Nearly one-third of global shipping traffic passes through this corridor. Any nation with sustained logistical, surveillance, and naval capabilities in this region automatically acquires significant strategic leverage. China understands this. The United States understands this. India can no longer afford hesitation.

India’s Maritime Shift in the Indo-Pacific

The Great Nicobar project is therefore not simply about ports and airports; it is about India’s emergence as a decisive maritime power in the Indo-Pacific.

For years, India’s strategic thinking remained overwhelmingly continental, shaped by land threats from Pakistan and China. Maritime affairs were often treated as secondary. Yet the 21st century has fundamentally altered global geopolitics. Economic power now flows through sea lanes, supply chains, energy corridors, and strategic ports. Nations that dominate maritime trade routes shape global commerce and diplomacy.

China recognised this transformation earlier than India. Through the Belt and Road Initiative and the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy, Beijing has invested heavily in ports stretching from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. These projects are not purely economic ventures; they are geopolitical assets designed to expand Chinese influence across the Indian Ocean Region.

India’s response had long been reactive and fragmented. Great Nicobar signals a shift toward proactive strategic planning.

Economic and Commercial Importance of Great Nicobar

The proposed international container transshipment terminal is especially significant. Currently, a large portion of India’s cargo is transshipped through foreign ports such as Singapore, Colombo, and Port Klang. This dependency weakens India’s economic efficiency and strategic autonomy. A world-class transhipment port at Great Nicobar could reduce that dependence while positioning India as a regional maritime logistics hub.

The island’s proximity to Southeast Asia also offers enormous commercial potential. As global supply chains diversify away from excessive dependence on China, India has an opportunity to integrate more deeply with Indo-Pacific trade networks. Great Nicobar could become a gateway linking India with ASEAN economies, East Asia, and Australia.

Strengthening India’s Defence and Surveillance Capabilities

Equally important is the defence dimension.

The Andaman and Nicobar Command is India’s only tri-service military command, yet for years it suffered from inadequate infrastructure and limited operational reach. Expanding facilities in Great Nicobar would strengthen India’s ability to monitor naval activity in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. In an age of intensifying Chinese naval expansion, such capabilities are no longer optional.

China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean is a strategic reality. Chinese research vessels frequently enter the region. PLA Navy deployments have become increasingly common. Beijing’s influence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the Maldives has expanded steadily over the last decade. India therefore needs permanent surveillance and rapid-response capabilities in the region.

Great Nicobar provides precisely that strategic depth.

The proposed airport and supporting military infrastructure would allow faster deployment of naval and air assets. Enhanced radar and intelligence systems would improve maritime domain awareness. In crisis scenarios, the island could function as a forward operating base for India’s eastern maritime theatre.

Environmental Concerns and Execution Challenges

Critics argue that the project risks environmental damage and threatens indigenous communities such as the Shompen tribe. These concerns deserve serious consideration and cannot simply be dismissed in the name of development. Great Nicobar is ecologically sensitive, home to unique biodiversity, tropical forests, and fragile coastal ecosystems. India must ensure that strategic ambition does not become ecological recklessness.

However, environmental concerns should not become an excuse for strategic paralysis.

Every major nation balances environmental protection with national security priorities. The key question is whether development can proceed responsibly, scientifically, and sustainably. India has the technological and institutional capacity to minimise ecological disruption if the project is implemented with transparency and accountability.

The real challenge lies in execution. India’s infrastructure history is filled with projects delayed by bureaucratic indecision, regulatory confusion, and political hesitation. Strategic projects cannot be allowed to stagnate indefinitely under endless procedural debates. China’s infrastructure rise was built on speed and long-term planning. While India rightly functions within democratic constraints, it must also develop the capacity for timely strategic execution.

Redefining India’s Indo-Pacific Vision

Another important dimension of the Great Nicobar initiative is its symbolism.

For decades, India’s island territories remained psychologically and administratively distant from the mainland imagination. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands were often viewed primarily through the lens of tourism or colonial history. The new project redefines them as central pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific vision.

This transformation aligns with India’s broader geopolitical evolution. Under its Indo-Pacific strategy, India is increasingly deepening partnerships with countries such as Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The Quad framework itself reflects the growing importance of maritime security in the region. Great Nicobar could become a strategic anchor supporting these partnerships.

Japan, in particular, has shown strong interest in Indo-Pacific infrastructure collaboration. As democratic nations seek alternatives to Chinese-controlled supply chains and maritime networks, India’s strategic geography becomes increasingly valuable. Great Nicobar strengthens India’s credibility as a serious Indo-Pacific actor rather than merely a regional power confined to South Asia.

Strategic Confidence and India’s Maritime Future

There is also a psychological aspect to the project that should not be underestimated. Nations rise not only through economic growth but through strategic confidence. Large-scale infrastructure projects often reflect national ambition and geopolitical self-belief. The Great Nicobar initiative sends a message that India is willing to think beyond immediate electoral cycles and invest in long-term strategic capabilities.

Yet ambition alone is insufficient.

India must ensure that local communities benefit from development rather than becoming victims of displacement or exclusion. Sustainable urban planning, environmental safeguards, disaster preparedness, and transparent governance must accompany strategic expansion. The island lies in a seismically sensitive zone, and infrastructure planning must incorporate resilience against earthquakes and tsunamis.

If executed intelligently, Great Nicobar could become for India what Singapore became for Southeast Asia a critical maritime and logistics node with outsized strategic importance.

The stakes are therefore enormous. This is not just an infrastructure project buried in bureaucratic paperwork. It is a test of whether India can finally align geography, strategy, economics, and political will into a coherent national vision.

The Indian Ocean is rapidly becoming the centre of global geopolitics. Energy routes, trade flows, naval competition, and strategic rivalries increasingly converge in these waters. India sits naturally at the heart of this geography, but geography alone guarantees nothing. Strategic advantage must be built, defended, and sustained.

Great Nicobar offers India that opportunity.

If India succeeds, the island may one day be remembered as the place where the country truly embraced its maritime destiny.

(The writer is a technocrat, political analyst, and author)

OPINION | India's Next Cyber Threat Won't Be Hacked. It Will Be Engineered: How Prepared Are We?

Rama Krishna Sreepada — Fri, 22 May 2026 14:55:29 +0530

For most of the last decade, India's cybersecurity conversation has stayed within familiar territory. Phishing scams, ransomware locking hospital systems, data breaches are all real, ongoing problems, and the security ecosystem has at least developed a working vocabulary for responding to them. What is taking shape now sits in a different category entirely.

It is not about extracting data or demanding ransom. It is about engineering failure directly into the systems that keep a modern society running.

From Opportunistic Attacks to Engineered Disruption

The difference between the two is not just technical. A ransomware attack finds a gap, exploits it, and makes its presence known immediately. An engineered systemic attack works differently. It embeds itself quietly, often into firmware, supply chain components, or industrial control environments, and it waits. There is no ransom note. The goal is disruption, timed for maximum operational damage.

India's digitization drive has created exactly the kind of interconnected environment where this becomes dangerous. Smart city deployments, 5G networks, IoT devices spread across energy grids, water systems, transport networks, and factory floors were built to be connected and efficient. Most were not built to withstand an adversary who has months or years to study them before acting.

The convergence of operational technology with information technology makes this worse. Industrial control systems and SCADA environments that once ran in isolation are now networked into the broader IT stack. What enters through a software vulnerability can, under the right conditions, reach the physical systems controlling a substation or a pipeline. That pathway has been demonstrated in real incidents abroad. Assuming India sits outside that risk category is not a position supported by evidence.

What AI Has Added to the Problem

Artificial intelligence has changed the calculus on the attacker's side in ways that are only beginning to be understood. Reconnaissance that once took weeks can now happen in hours. Social engineering attempts are more personalized and harder to detect as fraudulent. Attack frameworks can probe defenses, register what fails, and adapt in near real time. The signature-based detection tools that form the backbone of most security operations were not designed to handle that kind of dynamic adversary.

The deeper risk, though, is not AI as an attack tool but AI as an attack target. A predictive maintenance model governing industrial equipment, fed manipulated inputs over time, may not raise an alarm when it should. The system continues to report normal conditions while the underlying equipment moves toward failure. There is no intrusion to detect in the conventional sense. The damage is done through misdirection rather than breach.

Where the Risk Is Hiding

Supply chain security is the area where Indian policy has the largest gap between awareness and action. No software patch applied after installation resolves a compromise that was built in before the device ever arrived.

The question of what is in a system before it is switched on is one that national security frameworks have historically been slow to ask. That slowness is becoming harder to afford.

The Case for Resilience Over Reaction

Indian cybersecurity policy has largely been shaped by incidents. An attack happens, attention follows, investment comes after. For engineered systemic threats, that sequence is not viable. By the time the incident occurs, the groundwork for it may have been laid years earlier.

The alternative is designing infrastructure to withstand failure rather than only to prevent breach. Redundancy, operational continuity planning, and recovery capability need to be treated as structural requirements, not supplementary features. Cybersecurity criteria should enter the process at procurement, not at audit. Major national programmes in digital infrastructure should carry resilience standards with teeth, not advisory guidelines that organizations check off and move past.

Threat intelligence sharing between private infrastructure operators and government agencies also remains shallow. The organizations running power grids, telecom networks, and financial systems sit on information that is genuinely valuable for national defense. The frameworks for sharing it, at speed and at the level of operational detail that matters, are not yet functioning as they need to.

The Expertise That Does Not Yet Exist at Scale

India does not have enough professionals who specialize in operational technology security, AI security, or the intersection of physical and digital systems. The existing pipeline skews heavily toward IT security and compliance work. Compliance itself is part of the structural problem. When the objective is satisfying an audit rather than building genuine resilience, organisations learn to perform security rather than practice it.

The governance layer needs to keep pace with the technology layer. As AI-driven monitoring and autonomous response systems move into critical infrastructure, the questions of oversight, accountability, and what happens when an automated system makes the wrong call need answers before those systems are widely deployed, not after.

India is building its digital infrastructure at genuine scale. That is worth doing. But the cost of building it without adversarial resilience baked in from the start is a cost that does not show up immediately. It shows up later, when the failure is harder to recover from and the decisions that created the vulnerability are long in the past.

(The author is the Co-founder and Chief Architect at [x]cube LABS)

Disclaimer: The opinions, beliefs, and views expressed by the various authors and forum participants on this website are personal and do not reflect the opinions, beliefs, and views of ABP Network Pvt. Ltd.

OPINION | Understanding Mumbai’s AQI: The Lack Of A Unified Architecture

Justin M Bharucha — Fri, 22 May 2026 11:43:14 +0530

The Indian Constitution protects the right to a clean and healthy environment and imposes an obligation on the State to protect and improve the environment. That said, the air quality crisis across the country speaks for itself.

Turning specifically to Mumbai, it’s trite and contextually relevant to reiterate that Mumbai is part of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR); 6,300 sq. km of densely populated geographies extending across Thane, Navi Mumbai, Raigad, Kalyan-Dombivli, Vasai-Virar, and adjoining areas. Industrial activity, transport emissions, construction dust, peri-urban expansion, and coastal atmospheric circulation operate continuously across the MMR and the complexity of larger air circulation patterns is compounded by diurnal land and sea breezes.

Estimates cited by IIT Bombay suggest that approximately half of Mumbai’s PM2.5 burden may originate beyond the city itself. Road dust, vehicular emissions, industrial activity, construction dust, and secondary aerosol formation remain the principal contributors.

The Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB) increasingly recognises the MMR as a single atmospheric system. Recent enforcement action against ready-mix concrete plants across Thane, Navi Mumbai, and Kalyan reflects an operational understanding that pollution affecting Mumbai frequently originates outside municipal boundaries.

Reporting systems, the media, and such action as is taken, all continue to focus on Mumbai as a stand-alone city disjunct from the MMR. This necessarily precludes any meaningful redress since, again tritely but necessarily reiterated: An unidentified problem can’t be understood and can’t be addressed (leave aside redressed).

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, empower authorities to prescribe environmental standards, collect information, monitor pollutants, and coordinate enforcement.

The MPCB operates monitoring stations under the National Air Monitoring Programme, the State Air Monitoring Programme, and Continuous Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Stations (CAAQMS). In 2024, Maharashtra had 167 monitoring stations, including 69 real-time CAAQMS. Coverage within the MMR remains uneven, with several densely populated urban regions relying on a single station.

Recent initiatives by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), MPCB, and IIT Kanpur seek to expand monitoring through additional CAAQMS stations, hyperlocal sensor deployments, and construction-site monitoring mandates.

However, MPCB, BMC, CPCB, SAFAR, and independent sensor networks generate data through differing methodologies, calibration standards, and reporting systems. There exists no unified regional platform that aggregates or standardises this information. Studies have also identified calibration failures, flatlined pollutant readings, unit inconsistencies, and siting errors across monitoring stations.

The Need for a Unified Data Spine

The MMR requires a unified ‘data spine’, an interoperable regional architecture capable of aggregating, calibrating, standardising, and analysing air-quality information across agencies and jurisdictions.

Such a framework would integrate reference-grade monitoring stations, low-cost sensors, satellite observations, mobile sensor units, and predictive analytics into a single operational system. It would also support real-time public dashboards, hyperlocal forecasting, and targeted enforcement.

The statutory framework set out above is endorsed in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India and the actions in the Bombay High Court in PIL number 3 of 2023.

The financial case for integrated monitoring is equally strong.

A hybrid monitoring system combining reference-grade stations with calibrated low-cost sensors can achieve substantially greater spatial coverage at lower cost than a purely reference-grade network. IIT Kanpur conducted a pilot project which demonstrated that such a framework could generate more than 1,200 air-quality datapoints across Greater Mumbai at a fraction of conventional monitoring costs.

The pilot, however, was never scaled.

The MMR’s air quality challenge is, at present, fundamentally a data governance challenge. The legal framework already permits integrated action, and the technology already exists to build a better system. What is missing is a unified architecture that treats the MMR as a single airshed, ensures calibration and standardisation, fills spatial gaps, and produces evidence strong enough to support enforcement, planning, and public accountability. The missing data spine is the missing foundation on which we can begin to address and redress our crisis of air quality.

It’s easy to dismiss air quality as a problem at this time of year. Summer and the rains keep our air relatively breathable until the weather cools. It is equally the best time to keep our attention on the problem, which will arise in due course. I can’t say that we must prepare, but we should do everything we can to keep the authorities’ eye on this ball so that we can actually start making progress towards enjoying our fundamental right to clean air.

Justin M Bharucha is a Managing Partner at Bharucha & Partners.

OPINION | India-Bangladesh Bilateral Relations: No Clear Reset In Sight

Nayanima Basu — Thu, 21 May 2026 21:54:49 +0530

On August 5, 2024, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power following violent protests that began with the students of Bangladesh and were eventually taken up by civilians. This event signaled a clear message to the world: Bangladesh is changing, undergoing a significant socio-political transformation, and seeking a new sovereign identity. However, India, as Bangladesh's immediate and closest neighbor, has failed to recognize this shift and continues to misinterpret the emerging realities in the country.

Bangladesh went to the polls on February 12. The outcome, as expected, witnessed the comeback of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Tarique Rahman, who returned to the country after living abroad for 17 years, what was being touted as a self-imposed exile. Rahman’s entry into Bangladesh’s evolving political landscape did not come as a surprise either to Dhaka’s neighbours or to other partners like the United States or China. Both the U.S. as well as China did not want the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), which is in opposition now, to come to power despite its massive resurgence in the country, especially in the rural areas.

India, which has been completely aligned with the former Bangladesh Awami League government led by Hasina, started reaching out to Rahman upon his return to the country on December25, 2025. India even dispatched External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar to attend Rahman’s mother and former Prime Minister of Bangladesh Khaleda Zia’s funeral despite peak tensions between Delhi and Dhaka. The main cause for the tensions, which gave rise to an acrimonious relationship between the two former friendly countries, was the coming in of the interim government that ruled the country from August 2024 till February 2025, under Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus.

During Yunus’ tenure, the relationship between Delhi and Dhaka deteriorated significantly, reaching levels of tension not experienced in the last two decades. India expressed strong disapproval of the interim administration in Bangladesh, referring to its establishment as "illegal and unconstitutional." This discontent was further fuelled by reports of targeted attacks and violence against members of the Hindu community in Bangladesh, prompting India to voice its concerns.

Also Read: BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meet Sparks Optimism For A Productive Summit

In reaction to the escalating situation, both nations took steps to limit diplomatic exchanges, particularly in relation to visa issuance. Each government cited security concerns as the primary reason for these measures. The Bangladeshi interim government went so far as to suspend all non-essential visa categories for Indian citizens, allowing only for business and employment visas to remain operational. This decision was taken, according to the then interim administration, as a precautionary move following a series of threats and acts of vandalism directed at its diplomatic missions, notably in Kolkata and Agartala, as well as violent protests that occurred outside the Bangladeshi High Commission in New Delhi.

These actions reflected the growing distrust and volatility between the two nations, underscoring the fragility of diplomatic relations amid internal strife and external pressures. As a consequence, both diplomatic missions saw an increase in security measures, and the safety of diplomatic staff became a pressing concern as tensions persisted. The ongoing unrest not only affected bilateral ties but also raised alarm over the safety and well-being of minority communities within Bangladesh, further complicating an already fraught diplomatic landscape.

Meanwhile, the interim government also imposed a ban on the Awami League party disallowing it from participating in the elections. On the other hand, Hasina, who continues to live in a secret location in India, has been granted complete freedom to address her party workers, followers and the media through social media platforms and other backchannels. This also added to the growing tensions as Hasina continued to lambast the Yunus-led caretaker government as well as the BNP after it came to power. She has even accused that after her departure from the country there has been a sharp spike in militancy and terrorism-an allegation that has been vehemently denied by Yunus, BNP as well as BJI.

Distrust Remains

However, it was expected that with the arrival of a democratically elected and stable government in Dhaka, there would be a reset in the bilateral relationship. While the issuance of visas have resumed, some of the recent developments between both countries have given rise to more tensions.

Prime Minister Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony on February 17, was attended by Lok Sabha speaker Om Birla and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri. Subsequently, on March 20, Jaishankar met Bangladesh’s High Commissioner to India Riaz Hamidullah for the first time since he assumed charge on April 7, 2025.

This paved the way for the much-awaited visit of Khalilur Rahman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, to India, along with Humayun Kabir, the Adviser on Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. While India wanted to treat this visit as an “official visit”, Dhaka sought to play it down and called it to be a “goodwill visit”. During his meetings with Jaishankar and NSA Ajit Doval, Rahman expressed Dhaka’s concerns over their national security, with particular focus on river water sharing and border killings, which has been marked by the current dispensation in Dhaka as the topmost priority areas in order to smoothen the tensed bilateral ties.

It needs to be noted here that Rahman in his earlier avatar as the National Security Advisor (NSA) of Bangladesh came to New Delhi to meet his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval. Rahman was the NSA under the interim government of Bangladesh.

During his visit, the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister has reiterated that renewal of the three-decades old Ganges Water Treaty, which expires in December 2026, is their topmost priority. He also told his Indian counterpart to decisively address the equitable sharing of vital rivers like the Teesta are imperative steps that would transform public perceptions and foster closer ties between the nations.

Now that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has come to power in West Bengal, the Narendra Modi government will no longer be able to put the blame on the previous state government for not accommodating Bangladesh’s long-standing request on the River Teesta. Water is a state subject under the Constitution of India, therefore, the state government’s consent is key in transboundary river water sharing.

The Teesta deal was set to be signed during former PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh in September 2011 but was postponed at the last minute due to objections raised by former West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. The current Chief Minister of West Bengal Suvendu Adhikari is expected to come under pressure to take an opposite stance in this contentious matter.

Adhikari had placed the issue of illegal infiltration from Bangladesh at the center of his election campaign. His rhetoric and remarks frequently targeted Bangladesh in connection with border security, demographic concerns, and communal sentiments.

The Teesta River flows through Sikkim and then enters West Bengal before finally merging with the Brahmaputra in Assam and the Jamuna in Bangladesh. There are 54 rivers that pass through the Indo-Bangladesh border.

On September 6, 2022, India and Bangladesh had signed a key treaty to share the water of a key transboundary river, Kushiyara.

When Prime Minister Modi came to power in May 2014, he had promised as part of his ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy that the Teesta matter would be settled.

Coming to the issue of border management, India and Bangladesh share a 4,156 km long border which remains heavily militarized in order to curb cross-border crimes and illegal immigration. While India has fenced approximately 3,271 km, ongoing construction in disputed areas remains a source of diplomatic friction. The use of lethal force by the Border Security Force (BSF) continues to cause bilateral tensions.

Meanwhile, a recent interview given by Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma to an Indian media outlet has once again given rise to tensions between both countries. In the interview, Sarma said, “The 4,156 km India-Bangladesh border is heavily militarized to curb cross-border crimes and illegal immigration. While India has fenced approximately 3,271 km, ongoing construction in disputed areas remains a source of diplomatic friction. The use of lethal force by the Border Security Force (BSF) continues to cause bilateral tensions.”

He also said, his government “pushed back” illegal immigrants across the border during night time.

Bangladesh is also up in arms over recent remarks made by the Ministry of External Affairs over India’s long-pending request to Dhaka to verify the nationality of over 2,860 people whom “we think are Bangladeshi nationals, and they are staying here in India. We are yet to get a response on this particular matter.”

On the other hand, Dhaka’s proximity with China and Pakistan has also rattled New Delhi. After Bangladesh Foreign Minister Rahman’s visit to China, Prime Minister Rahman is expected to undertake his first official state visit to Beijing.

In an unprecedented move, Dhaka has also decided to send its civil servants for training in Pakistan-a first since Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971.

Therefore, a reset between India and Bangladesh, once considered the closest of neighbours in the region, is still a distant goal. The Modi government is seeking ways to improve diplomatic relations, and a significant step in this direction is the recent appointment of Dinesh Trivedi as New Delhi’s envoy to Bangladesh. By choosing Trivedi, a seasoned politician rather than a traditional career diplomat, India aims to convey to Dhaka that fostering stronger political ties is currently its highest priority.

This decision suggests an intent to approach diplomatic relations with a fresh perspective and to engage more directly at the political level. However, despite this hopeful development, the journey towards rebuilding trust and cooperation remains fraught with challenges. Historical grievances, differing political agendas, and growing bilateral tensions continue to complicate the path forward, making the task of establishing a renewed partnership between the two countries a complex and formidable undertaking.

Also Read: OPINION | Delhi Must Listen To Ladakh's Demands, Ignoring Can Prove Costly

Nayanima Basu is a senior independent journalist.

OPINION | Security, Connectivity And China: The Rising Importance Of India’s Northeast

Ulupi Borah — Thu, 21 May 2026 10:59:56 +0530

India’s Northeast is no longer viewed merely as a remote frontier region. With rising tensions along the China border, instability in Myanmar and New Delhi’s growing Indo-Pacific ambitions, the strategically sensitive region is increasingly becoming central to India’s national security and economic vision.

India’s second Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and former Eastern Command chief General Anil Chauhan has stressed that national security and regional development are deeply interconnected. According to him, infrastructure, connectivity, local participation and border stability directly influence the country’s long-term security interests.

Bordering China and Myanmar while also sharing proximity with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, the Northeast occupies a critical position in India’s geopolitical calculations. Experts now argue that these frontier regions should not be treated simply as military buffer zones, but as areas requiring sustained economic growth, technological integration and social stability.

Northeast Emerging as Key Strategic Gateway

Connected to mainland India through the narrow Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck”, the Northeast has historically faced challenges including difficult terrain, insurgency and weak infrastructure.

However, India’s strategic outlook towards the region has shifted significantly in recent years. Under the Centre’s “Act East Policy”, the Northeast is now being positioned as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia.

Major connectivity projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are expected to strengthen trade links while enhancing India’s strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific region.

At the same time, continuing tensions along the Arunachal Pradesh border with China and growing concerns over infiltration linked to the Myanmar crisis have made the region even more strategically sensitive.

Security and Development Seen as Interlinked

General Chauhan has repeatedly underlined that military preparedness in border regions cannot be separated from economic development and infrastructure expansion.

Roads, tunnels, bridges, logistics systems and internet connectivity are now viewed not only as development tools but also as strategic necessities in modern warfare and border management.

Given the Northeast’s difficult geography, there has been increasing emphasis on building dual-use infrastructure that benefits both civilians and the armed forces.

Strong highways and improved connectivity help the military rapidly move troops and equipment during emergencies, while also opening access to healthcare, markets and employment opportunities for local communities.

Military experts increasingly argue that speed, connectivity and resilient supply chains are now as important as conventional troop deployment in determining strategic advantage.

Border Villages No Longer Seen as ‘Last Villages’

One of the most significant shifts in India’s border strategy has been the changing perception of villages located near international boundaries.

Earlier, villages in Arunachal Pradesh and other frontier regions were often viewed as the country’s “last villages”. Policymakers are now increasingly describing them as India’s “first villages”.

The idea reflects the belief that maintaining population presence in sensitive border areas is essential for preserving India’s strategic grip over frontier regions.

Security experts warn that migration caused by economic hardship or poor infrastructure could weaken India’s hold in strategically important areas. In contrast, economically stable and connected border communities can strengthen local intelligence gathering and long-term security.

The government’s Vibrant Villages Programme reflects this approach by focusing on roads, telecommunications, tourism, healthcare and employment generation in border districts.

Technology and Youth Seen as Future Force Multipliers

General Chauhan has also emphasised the importance of technological readiness, cyber resilience and digital literacy in addressing future security challenges.

According to him, future conflicts will increasingly depend on artificial intelligence, cyber security, drones and advanced communication technologies rather than conventional military strength alone.

This vision holds particular significance for the youth of the Northeast, where geographical isolation had historically limited access to opportunities.

Experts believe that improving digital infrastructure and technical education could simultaneously accelerate regional development and strengthen national security.

The region’s emerging startup ecosystem is already being viewed as a positive sign, with expanding internet connectivity opening new avenues for innovation, entrepreneurship and employment.

Civil-Military Cooperation Critical During Disasters

The Northeast remains highly vulnerable to floods, landslides and earthquakes, making disaster response another key aspect of regional security planning.

General Chauhan has consistently advocated stronger civil-military cooperation to improve crisis response mechanisms across the region.

During natural disasters, the Indian Army’s engineering units, rescue teams and logistical capabilities often work alongside civilian authorities to restore communication networks, evacuate residents and deliver medical aid.

Such humanitarian assistance not only helps communities during emergencies but also strengthens trust between local populations and the armed forces.

Security analysts say this model reinforces the credibility of the state in sensitive regions while reducing the influence of separatist or anti-national elements.

A New Strategic Vision for India’s Borders

The evolving approach towards the Northeast reflects a broader strategic doctrine in which security, development, connectivity, technology and social resilience are treated as interconnected goals.

Rather than viewing border regions purely through a military lens, policymakers are increasingly framing them as engines of growth and strategic integration.

The approach also reflects the Indian Army’s longstanding ethos of functioning not only as a fighting force but also as an institution that builds trust, restores confidence and integrates remote communities into the national mainstream.

For India, the future of the Northeast is now tied not just to border defence, but to the country’s wider economic, geopolitical and strategic ambitions.

Ulupi Borah is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre For Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). Her expertise centres around the Indo-Pacific region, maritime security, and emerging technologies.

OPINION | India’s Invisible Farm Workers Are Feeding The Economy While AI Looks The Other Way

Gourav Sanghai — Wed, 20 May 2026 16:54:30 +0530

Every harvest season, tens of millions of people vanish from their villages. They travel hundreds of kilometers across state lines, bend over fields that are not theirs,and return months later often without a single digital footprint to show for it. There is no record of their work, no proof of their earnings, and no trace of their skill. Meanwhile, the farms they work on are undergoing a technological renaissance.

In an era where AI algorithms dictate precision irrigation and satellite imaging predicts crop yields, India has built an extraordinary digital infrastructure around its soil yet almost none around its people.

ALSO READ: Surveillance First, Severance Next: Meta Tracked Workers to Train AI, Then Cut 8,000 Jobs

From Harvest Hands To Data Ghosts

This asymmetry is not incidental; it is the central challenge of building a modern agricultural economy. Agriculture absorbs over 46% of India's national workforce, a share that has surprisingly risen over the last few years. Among the estimated 402 million domestic migrants moving within the country, millions cross state lines annually specifically for farm work.

Yet, on e-Shram, India's national registry of unorganied workers, over 31.48 people are swept under a single, static label: "agricultural worker". That label is where the data ends.

There is no distinction between a grape pruner in Nashik, a sugarcane harvester in Baramati, or a paddy transplanter in Odisha. The specialised skills embedded in this workforce are simply invisible to the systems that are supposed to represent them.

This invisibility is a cascade of compounding absences. Surveys often arrive after workers have already migrated, and official portals demand a level of digital literacy many do not possess. Consequently, workers find themselves trapped in a documentation trap, where updating papers across state lines transforms into a bureaucratic maze. Because most wages are paid in cash, labourers carry no wage trail, have no employment history, and have no route to formal credit.

Furthermore, with real agricultural wages stagnating at less than a percent annual growth for nearly a decade, the lack of causal data on why and when families migrate leaves policymakers operating in the dark.

ALSO READ: Antigravity 2.0 Looks Great On Paper, But Claude Code & Codex Are Not Going Anywhere

Can AI Finally Give Rural Migrant Workers A Digital Identity?

Today, the invisibility of the Indian agricultural worker is not just a welfare problem it is a global trade problem, as international buyers increasingly demand human-layer traceability in crop supply chains.

However, artificial intelligence is uniquely positioned to bridge this profound data gap. The technology to organise this ecosystem now exists, and its integration is finally financially viable. Startups and tech innovators are leveraging AI to build "digital village twins" living micro-maps that dynamically connect skill profiles, migration calendars, and seasonal availability.

By replacing static census tables that age the moment they are published, predictive AI models can now match verified labour crews with specific farm requirements across horticultural belts.

Perhaps the most transformative application of AI in rural labour is the rise of voice-first interfaces. Rural India is not just multilingual; it is micro-dialectal. Navigating this landscape has historically been an insurmountable barrier to data collection. But recent advancements have seen generative AI voice agents, trained on over 30,000 hours of agricultural conversations, delivering real-time, hyper-local guidance in languages like Telugu and Tamil. These same AI rails can be repurposed to interact with labourers, naturally collecting work logs and skill data at scale through simple voice commands on platforms like WhatsApp completely bypassing the need for written forms.

To fully harness this AI revolution, structural reforms must align with the technology. Deepening worker classifications and extending the reach of India’s Digital Agriculture Mission which has already allocated over 76 million Farmers Id’s to include labourers will create an open data commons for migration patterns and productivity benchmarks.

A farmer in Nashik can already access AI-generated weather forecasts and satellite imagery on her phone. But the worker who prunes her vines still operates in a data-dark economy, lacking access to the same technological resources and information that could enhance their productivity and working conditions.

While India's agriculture sector boasts a resilient 5% annual growth, a massive productivity gap persists between the farm and formal non-farm sectors. The next frontier in Indian agriculture isn't another smart sensor in the soil. It uses artificial intelligence to provide those who tend the soil with a digital presence that reflects their economic importance. When that happens, the invisibility that defines today's rural labour market will no longer be a permanent condition but rather a problem that is simply waiting for the right technology to solve it.

OPINION | Human Security In Ruins: The Iran-US Conflict And Its Catastrophic Toll On Civilian Life

Abhinav Mehrotra — Wed, 20 May 2026 08:31:06 +0530

The conflict between Iran and the United States has long been studied as a geopolitical standoff, marked by a cold war of sanctions, proxy forces, and nuclear brinkmanship in recent decades. As of 2026, that framework no longer holds, since what once seemed like a managed rivalry has collapsed into open warfare, dragging many countries into it, and millions of civilians across West Asia are facing displacement, medical collapse, economic ruin, and death on account of the open hostilities. The human security consequences are no longer theoretical; they are increasingly documented, ongoing, and devastating.

From Cold Conflict to Open War

For decades, the United States and Iran maintained a posture of hostility without direct military confrontation. It changed in stages over the years. The collapse of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after the Trump administration's withdrawal in 2018 marked the beginning of a new phase of a "maximum pressure" campaign. Various sanctions were reimposed, crippling Iran's economy. Iran's currency entered freefall, particularly after a brief Israeli–US military exchange known as the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, which targeted Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure.

By late December 2025, Iran's economic collapse had produced its most serious popular uprising since the 1979 revolution. Protests spread across more than 200 cities, fuelled by record inflation and crumbling infrastructure. The Iranian government's response was catastrophic, and security forces massacred thousands of demonstrators, with Iran's own Ministry of Health reporting at least 30,000 killed in the January 2026 crackdown. This is the largest such killing in modern Iranian history.

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran that were codenamed Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion, respectively. They started by striking Tehran and other cities across the country, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior military and government officials. Hundreds of civilians died in the first days alone, including more than 100 children at a primary school in southern Iran. What may have been feared as a potential escalation had become all-out war, leading to many casualties and damage to property and infrastructure.

The Humanitarian Collapse

The scale of civilian suffering since February 2026 has been severe. According to UNHCR, the escalation triggered major displacement across West Asia, including large-scale internal displacement in Iran and Lebanon. In Iran alone, government estimates cited by UNHCR suggest that between 600,000 and 1 million households temporarily fled their homes. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghans living in Iran were returned to Afghanistan, often under coercive circumstances, placing additional pressure on a country already facing a profound humanitarian and food-security crisis.

Healthcare infrastructure, already weakened by years of sanctions, has been systematically dismantled. According to figures cited by the World Health Organisation from the Iranian Red Crescent, more than 300 health, medical, and emergency facilities had been damaged by early April 2026. The conflict caused severe disruption to Iran’s healthcare infrastructure, including reported attacks on hospitals, laboratories, and research institutions. Humanitarian organisations also warned that interruptions to electricity, communications, and medical supply chains were placing pregnant women, chronically ill patients, and emergency responders under growing strain.

Sanctions as a Weapon Against Civilians

Even before the open hostilities started, sanctions had already constituted a form of structural violence against ordinary Iranians. Iran's inflation rate reached 40% by 2024, according to IMF projections and has risen further since then. The rial's collapse and trade restrictions made it nearly impossible for hospitals and pharmacies to import life-saving medicines, despite technical humanitarian exemptions in US sanctions law. The broad nature of economic sanctions, particularly those targeting the global banking system, restricted Iranians' access to healthcare, food security, and income in ways that humanitarian exemptions could not adequately offset.

The economic data tell a similar story: Iran's GDP growth is projected to slow in 2024, and the country has entered economic contraction since then, meaning it is producing fewer goods and services than in previous periods. Oil exports had fallen, and youth unemployment remained persistently high. Economic misery, compounded by political repression, created the conditions for the December 2025 uprising that ultimately preceded the war.

A Region in Crisis

Iran's retaliatory strikes following the February 2026 attacks broadened the conflict when it launched missiles and drones at Israel, US military bases, and civilian infrastructure across all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE- as well as Iraq and Jordan, killing many and causing damage to military and non-military infrastructure. In Lebanon, the conflict reignited fighting that killed more than 2,000 civilians and militants. In Iraq, at least 118 people were killed, according to health authorities. UNICEF verified that 200 children had been killed and 800 injured in Lebanon alone since the March escalation.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil passes, became a flashpoint of the war, with Iranian attacks targeting vessels and oil infrastructure. Disruption to one of the world's most critical energy corridors sent reverberations through global commodity markets, raising fuel and food costs in countries that had no part in the conflict.

The Failure of Political Calculation

The 2026 Iran war is a case study in what happens when diplomatic failure is treated as an opportunity rather than a warning. Indirect nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran had been underway as recently as February 2026. Omani mediators reported significant progress, with Iran willing to make concessions. Those talks were abandoned. The human cost of that abandonment is now measured in thousands of lives, millions of displaced persons, and a regional humanitarian system that, as UNHCR has warned, is critically underfunded, with more funding required for Iran alone having been secured.

This conflict, which was a manageable geopolitical rivalry in which sanctions nudge governments and military posturing deters escalation, has now moved beyond it. But this proposition has been exposed as dangerously naïve by this conflict. Economic strangulation, when sustained long enough, does not produce compliance. It produces collapse and protest. The civilians of Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and beyond did not choose this conflict. They are paying for it with their health, their homes, and their lives.

Sustainable security cannot be built through collective punishment or military dominance. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March 2026 has exposed a reality often hidden in discussions of energy security. What moves through the Strait is not merely fuel for global markets, but also the foundation of everyday life in electricity, transport, food production, medicines, and employment. When those flows are disrupted, the consequences are felt far beyond the Gulf, especially by populations already living with economic insecurity.

The IMF warned in April 2026 that the global outlook had “abruptly darkened” amid surging energy prices and intensifying inflation. Yet the real significance of the crisis lies less in macroeconomic indicators than in what they mean for ordinary households. For fuel-importing countries across Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, rising oil prices translate into higher transport costs, more expensive food, and shrinking purchasing power. Governments with limited resources are forced into difficult choices between subsidising essentials, servicing debt, or cutting welfare spending.

Food insecurity has become one of the clearest human consequences of the disruption. Rising fertiliser and fuel costs threaten agricultural production and drive up food prices, pushing vulnerable populations closer to hunger. The World Food Programme warned that millions more could face acute food insecurity despite having no connection to the geopolitical decisions that produced the crisis.

The same pressures extend to health systems. Higher energy costs affect the transportation of medicines, vaccine storage, and hospital operations, particularly in poorer states with already fragile healthcare infrastructure. The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz is the most analytically important dimension of the Iran–US conflict precisely because it exposes the central weakness in how human security is conventionally understood: the assumption that its dimensions are separable. Economic security, food security, and health security are treated in most policy frameworks as distinct categories, each with its own indicators and interventions. The human security framework makes clear that wars fought over strategic dominance do not remain confined to battlefields. They travel through supply chains and commodity markets into the lives of ordinary people far removed from the conflict itself. They are the foreseeable, measurable, and in many cases modelled consequences of decisions made by actors who had access to precisely this evidence and proceeded to take military action regardless.

Abhinav Mehrotra is an Associate Professor and Assistant Director, and Amit Upadhyay is an Associate Professor and Senior Fellow at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University.

OPINION | India’s Forex Anxiety And The Illusion Of Self-Reliance

Dr Prosenjit Nath — Tue, 19 May 2026 20:23:46 +0530

Modi’s austerity appeal reflects a deeper economic vulnerability that India can no longer ignore.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent call for austerity urging Indians to cut discretionary spending such as foreign travel and gold purchases is not merely a symbolic appeal to patriotism. It is a revealing moment in India’s economic trajectory. Governments do not ask
citizens to tighten their belts unless they fear turbulence ahead. Behind the rhetoric of discipline and self-reliance lies a more uncomfortable reality: India’s foreign exchange reserves, though still substantial on paper, are under growing strain from structural weaknesses that policy slogans alone cannot fix.

At first glance, there appears little reason for panic. India’s foreign exchange reserves stand at roughly $690bn, among the largest in the world. Most countries would envy such a buffer. Yet the sharp decline from February’s record $728bn matters because reserves are not judged merely by size; they are judged by sustainability, confidence, and the direction of movement. Markets react less to how much a country possesses today than to whether it seems capable of maintaining stability tomorrow.

The problem is that India’s economic pressures are converging all at once.

The country’s import dependence remains extraordinarily high in sectors critical to economic survival. India imports about 90 per cent of its oil and 60 per cent of its natural gas requirements. That dependence leaves the economy deeply vulnerable to geopolitical shocks,
especially at a moment when global energy politics are becoming increasingly unstable. Wars in the Middle East, shipping disruptions, sanctions, and great-power rivalries all translate directly into inflationary pressure inside India.

The numbers are alarming. India spent approximately $174bn on energy imports in the last financial year alone. Gold imports reached $72bn, while silver imports surged dramatically. Fertilizer imports also rose sharply. Combined, these import categories have more than doubled in cost within four years. This is not merely a cyclical issue caused by temporary price spikes. It reflects a consumption-heavy growth model dependent on external resources.

India’s leaders often celebrate the country as the world’s fastest-growing major economy. But growth built on imported energy and imported commodities carries hidden fragilities. Every rise in oil prices widens the trade deficit, weakens the rupee, and increases inflationary pressure. The current account becomes hostage to events beyond India’s control.

At the same time, the inflow side of the equation is deteriorating. Foreign portfolio investors have been steadily withdrawing money from Indian markets. In the past two months alone, billions of dollars have exited. Such outflows are especially dangerous because portfolio capital is notoriously volatile. It enters rapidly during periods of optimism and exits just as quickly when global uncertainty rises.

Even more concerning is the weakness in net foreign direct investment. India has long marketed itself as a destination for long-term global capital, supported by demographic growth, digital infrastructure, and manufacturing ambitions. Yet if foreign investors are extracting more capital than they are injecting, confidence may not be as strong as official narratives suggest.

This matters because India’s development strategy increasingly relies on foreign investment to finance domestic expansion. Without strong inflows, the burden shifts back onto reserves, borrowing, or inflationary financing.

The irony is that India’s vulnerability is becoming visible precisely when the world economy is entering a new age of geopolitical fragmentation. Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing alongside American corporate giants such as Apple’s Tim Cook, Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, Tesla’s Elon Musk, and Citigroup’s Jane Fraser underscores how deeply economics and geopolitics are now intertwined. Even as Washington and Beijing compete strategically, they remain economically entangled because both recognize the costs of separation.

India, by contrast, often speaks the language of self-reliance while remaining highly exposed to global shocks.

The government’s push for coal gasification and energy autonomy reflects this recognition. The recently approved multi-billion-dollar plan is part of a broader attempt to reduce import dependence and strengthen domestic energy security. Strategically, the logic is understandable. India cannot aspire to geopolitical influence while remaining so dependent on imported fuel.

Yet there are limitations to this strategy. Coal gasification may improve energy resilience, but it also raises environmental concerns at a time when climate pressures are intensifying. Moreover, large industrial projects take years to deliver meaningful results. They do not solve immediate forex pressures.

Nor can austerity campaigns substitute for structural reform. Asking citizens to buy less gold may temporarily reduce import bills, but gold purchases in India are deeply cultural and often reflect distrust in financial systems rather than simple consumer indulgence. Households buy gold because it serves as informal security against inflation, uncertainty, and weak social safety nets.

Similarly, restricting foreign travel or luxury spending may generate headlines but will not fundamentally alter the macroeconomic equation. The real issue is productivity and competitiveness.

India still imports more than it exports because its manufacturing ecosystem remains uneven. Despite years of “Make in India” campaigns, the country has struggled to become a dominant global exporter in the way China once did. Infrastructure bottlenecks, regulatory inconsistency, logistical inefficiencies, and uneven labour reforms continue to hinder industrial competitiveness.

Trump’s tariffs have added another layer of difficulty by constraining export opportunities to the United States. Although India has pursued multiple trade agreements, implementation remains slow and fragmented. Trade diplomacy alone cannot compensate for domestic weaknesses.

The larger danger is psychological. Economic confidence can deteriorate gradually and then suddenly. As long as reserves remain large, policymakers may feel insulated. But history shows that emerging economies can move from stability to stress very quickly once markets begin questioning sustainability. Currency pressure, inflation, and capital flight often reinforce one another.

India is not in crisis today. Comparisons with past balance-of-payments emergencies would be exaggerated. The country still possesses significant buffers, a resilient banking system, and strong remittance inflows from overseas Indians. But complacency would be equally misguided.

Modi’s austerity appeal signals that the government understands the risks are mounting. The challenge is that symbolic restraint will not be enough. India needs a deeper transformation toward export competitiveness, energy diversification, and investment stability. Otherwise, every geopolitical shock from Middle Eastern conflict to US-China tensions will continue to reverberate through the Indian economy with disproportionate force.

For now, India watches the world nervously. It watches oil prices, capital flows, Washington, Beijing, and the Gulf. The country may aspire to strategic autonomy, but its economic vulnerabilities reveal how difficult true autonomy remains in an interconnected and increasingly
unstable global order.

The writer is a technocrat, political analyst, and author)